Chứng khoán 2009 - Phần 19 - Cơ hội cướp lại những gì đã mất!

[Phantom_VN]

haizzz...dọa bắn tên lửa mà chẳng thấy bắn gì cả.Không biết tuần sau chứng như nào các anh nhỉ? Khó ghê:102:

 

[huytct]

haizzz...dọa bắn tên lửa mà chẳng thấy bắn gì cả.Không biết tuần sau chứng như nào các anh nhỉ? Khó ghê:102:

Bắn rồi mà cụ! Chỉ mỗi tội là chú Nhựt Bổn ko dám bắn hạ thôi! Thằng Triều Tiên máu thật!
Em thấy thị trường Future xanh lắm! Chắc mai lại xanh thôi! :102::102: Cơ hội mua lại của em có vẻ khó đây!

 

[bizviet]

Có gì mà khó hehehe

NK hôm nay tạo mô hình cái bia mộ. DJ thì lình xình 2 ngày rồi.

Có 1 bài báo rất hay. Nhưng vì link ở trên net phải đăng ký mới đọc được, nên nhà em xin phép mode post thẳng vào đây để anh em tham khảo:

Why this will not be a normal cyclical recovery

By Roger Altman

Published: April 5 2009 19:23 | Last updated: April 5 2009 19:23

The rare nature of this recession precludes a cyclically normal US recovery. Instead, we are consigned to a slow, painful climb-out, as are nations such as Japan and Mexico that depend on US demand. The implications for US policy include a likely second round of stimulus, much more federal capital for the banking system and stunning budget deficits that will slow key initiatives for President Barack Obama, such as healthcare and energy reform.

What is unusual is that this is a balance-sheet driven recession, centred on the damaged financial condition of both households and banks. These weaknesses mandate sub-normal levels of consumer spending and overall lending for about three years.

In contrast, most postwar recessions had a different sequence – rising inflationary pressures, a monetary tightening to counter them and, then, a slowdown in response to higher interest rates. This was the pattern of the sharp 1980-81 slowdown.

None of that happened here. Instead, we saw a housing and credit market collapse that caused enormous losses among households and banks. The result was a steep drop in discretionary consumer spending and a halt to lending. To see why recovery will be slow, we can look at the balance sheet damage. For households, net worth peaked in mid-2007 at $64,400bn (€47,750, £43,449bn) but fell to $51,500bn at the end of 2008, a swift 20 per cent fall. With average family income at $50,000, and falling in real terms since 2000, a 20 per cent drop in net worth is big – especially when household debt reached 130 per cent of income in 2008.

This debt derived from Americans spending more than their income, reflecting the positive wealth effect. Households felt wealthier, despite pressure on incomes, because home and financial asset values were rising. Now that wealth effect has reversed with a vengeance. The crisis and unemployment have frightened households into raising savings rates for the first time in years. They had been stagnant at 1-2 per cent of income but have surged to nearly 5 per cent. With reduced incomes, only cutting discretionary spending can produce higher savings. This explains why personal consumption expenditures fell at record rates at the end of 2008.

Consumer spending, however, has approximated 70 per cent of US gross domestic product for the past decade and dominates our economy. But household balance sheets will not be rebuilt soon. Home values will keep falling through mid-2010 and there is no precedent for equity markets, still down 45 per cent from their peak, to make those losses up in just two years. It is illogical, therefore, to expect a full snap-back in the consumer sector in 2010 or 2011. This alone mandates a drawn-out, weak recovery.

The second key sector is the financial one. According to the International Monetary Fund, western financial institutions, mostly in the US, have realised $1,000bn of losses on US-originated assets since the crisis began. The IMF has estimated that unrealised losses may amount to another $1,000bn. With residential and commercial real estate steadily declining, this is possible. This is why the banking sector cannot make new loans. These losses are eating into banks’ capital and shrinking their capacity to add assets. Funds from the Troubled Asset Relief Program are only replacing lost capital, not increasing it. When might they end? With key categories of toxic assets still losing value, the answer is: not soon. The scale of lending needed to support a normal cyclical recovery will not materialise.

A third constraint on recovery may involve the federal balance sheet. The fiscal and monetary engines are currently on full throttle. But, within two years, concerns over budget deficits and inflation may revive, compelling the Federal Reserve to raise interest rates and Congress to adopt deficit reduction steps. These actions, contractionary by definition, could occur before a full recovery has asserted itself. On that basis, the federal balance sheet would also limit a full recovery.

This weak outlook is likely to force a second injection of spending rises and tax cuts in 2010 to prod demand. Despite public opposition, substantially more federal capital will be required for banks. The deficit outlook will worsen, perhaps to $1,000bn annually over 10 years. That will force a slowing of Mr Obama’s investment plans. That is a shame, because those investments are needed, but this balance sheet recession will be too deep.

The writer is chairman and CEO of Evercore Partners and former deputy Treasury secretary in the Clinton Administration

Bắn rồi mà cụ! Chỉ mỗi tội là chú Nhựt Bổn ko dám bắn hạ thôi! Thằng Triều Tiên máu thật!
Em thấy thị trường Future xanh lắm! Chắc mai lại xanh thôi! :102::102: Cơ hội mua lại của em có vẻ khó đây!

 

[bes]

Bắn rồi mà cụ! Chỉ mỗi tội là chú Nhựt Bổn ko dám bắn hạ thôi! Thằng Triều Tiên máu thật!
Em thấy thị trường Future xanh lắm! Chắc mai lại xanh thôi! :102::102: Cơ hội mua lại của em có vẻ khó đây!

Anh Nhật bửn cũng chỉ chém gió thôi, dọa léo được ...thì thôi.
Bố bảo dám bắn hạ.
1. Bắn trượt thì ngượng người, đêk ai dám đảm bảo là bắn trúng
2. Nhỡ bắn trúng, thằng hâm nó táng cho quả tên lửa khác vào đất Nhật thì có mà chết vô khối.

 

[bes]

Có gì mà khó hehehe

NK hôm nay tạo mô hình cái bia mộ. DJ thì lình xình 2 ngày rồi.

Có 1 bài báo rất hay. Nhưng vì link ở trên net phải đăng ký mới đọc được, nên nhà em xin phép mode post thẳng vào đây để anh em tham khảo:

Why this will not be a normal cyclical recovery

By Roger Altman

Published: April 5 2009 19:23 | Last updated: April 5 2009 19:23

The rare nature of this recession precludes a cyclically normal US recovery. Instead, we are consigned to a slow, painful climb-out, as are nations such as Japan and Mexico that depend on US demand. The implications for US policy include a likely second round of stimulus, much more federal capital for the banking system and stunning budget deficits that will slow key initiatives for President Barack Obama, such as healthcare and energy reform.

What is unusual is that this is a balance-sheet driven recession, centred on the damaged financial condition of both households and banks. These weaknesses mandate sub-normal levels of consumer spending and overall lending for about three years.

In contrast, most postwar recessions had a different sequence – rising inflationary pressures, a monetary tightening to counter them and, then, a slowdown in response to higher interest rates. This was the pattern of the sharp 1980-81 slowdown.

None of that happened here. Instead, we saw a housing and credit market collapse that caused enormous losses among households and banks. The result was a steep drop in discretionary consumer spending and a halt to lending. To see why recovery will be slow, we can look at the balance sheet damage. For households, net worth peaked in mid-2007 at $64,400bn (€47,750, £43,449bn) but fell to $51,500bn at the end of 2008, a swift 20 per cent fall. With average family income at $50,000, and falling in real terms since 2000, a 20 per cent drop in net worth is big – especially when household debt reached 130 per cent of income in 2008.

This debt derived from Americans spending more than their income, reflecting the positive wealth effect. Households felt wealthier, despite pressure on incomes, because home and financial asset values were rising. Now that wealth effect has reversed with a vengeance. The crisis and unemployment have frightened households into raising savings rates for the first time in years. They had been stagnant at 1-2 per cent of income but have surged to nearly 5 per cent. With reduced incomes, only cutting discretionary spending can produce higher savings. This explains why personal consumption expenditures fell at record rates at the end of 2008.

Consumer spending, however, has approximated 70 per cent of US gross domestic product for the past decade and dominates our economy. But household balance sheets will not be rebuilt soon. Home values will keep falling through mid-2010 and there is no precedent for equity markets, still down 45 per cent from their peak, to make those losses up in just two years. It is illogical, therefore, to expect a full snap-back in the consumer sector in 2010 or 2011. This alone mandates a drawn-out, weak recovery.

The second key sector is the financial one. According to the International Monetary Fund, western financial institutions, mostly in the US, have realised $1,000bn of losses on US-originated assets since the crisis began. The IMF has estimated that unrealised losses may amount to another $1,000bn. With residential and commercial real estate steadily declining, this is possible. This is why the banking sector cannot make new loans. These losses are eating into banks’ capital and shrinking their capacity to add assets. Funds from the Troubled Asset Relief Program are only replacing lost capital, not increasing it. When might they end? With key categories of toxic assets still losing value, the answer is: not soon. The scale of lending needed to support a normal cyclical recovery will not materialise.

A third constraint on recovery may involve the federal balance sheet. The fiscal and monetary engines are currently on full throttle. But, within two years, concerns over budget deficits and inflation may revive, compelling the Federal Reserve to raise interest rates and Congress to adopt deficit reduction steps. These actions, contractionary by definition, could occur before a full recovery has asserted itself. On that basis, the federal balance sheet would also limit a full recovery.

This weak outlook is likely to force a second injection of spending rises and tax cuts in 2010 to prod demand. Despite public opposition, substantially more federal capital will be required for banks. The deficit outlook will worsen, perhaps to $1,000bn annually over 10 years. That will force a slowing of Mr Obama’s investment plans. That is a shame, because those investments are needed, but this balance sheet recession will be too deep.

The writer is chairman and CEO of Evercore Partners and former deputy Treasury secretary in the Clinton Administration

Khà khà, ngày nghỉ anh em té đi chơi hết - còn mỗi cụ biz vẫn chịu khó ngồi nghiên cứu.
Dài quá, lại tiếng Anh nữa, cụ rút gọn lấy phần tinh túy cái nhỉ.
DJ vẫn đang ngày nghỉ đúng không ạ?

 

[Phantom_VN]

bài rất hay...thks anh Biz nhiều ạ (l)

 

[bizviet]

Tình hình có vẻ chiều lòng nhiều bác.

NY tạo bia mộ.
Châu Âu đang Tèo
DJ có dấu hiệu tèo sau 2 phiên lình xình.

"U.S. Stock Futures Retreat on Banking Concern; Sun Tumbles

April 6 (Bloomberg) -- U.S. stock futures fell as analyst Mike Mayo said bank loan losses will exceed levels in the Great Depression and concern grew that International Business Machines Corp.’s talks to buy Sun Microsystems Inc. have collapsed. "

Gần đây mọi người không quan tâm nhiều đến tình hình trong nước do chẳng tin bố con thằng nào

 

[bes]

Tình hình có vẻ chiều lòng nhiều bác.

NY tạo bia mộ.
Châu Âu đang Tèo
DJ có dấu hiệu tèo sau 2 phiên lình xình.

Gần đây mọi người không quan tâm nhiều đến tình hình trong nước do chẳng tin bố con thằng nào

Sáng mai có trần đầu giờ được 1 lúc không nhỉ để em còn té kịp :21::21::21:

 

[nlthanh]

bài rất hay...thks anh Biz nhiều ạ (l)

Thấy bác khen hay nên em cũng thấy hay .... mặc dù em chả biết tí tiếng Inh-lít nào:21::21:

 

[MinhKhoiTài khoản đã xác minh]

Các cụ bên này dạo này xôm nhỉ,cho em chung vui với,mai có tèo không ạ *-)*-)

 

[tổ lái]

Có gì mà khó hehehe

NK hôm nay tạo mô hình cái bia mộ. DJ thì lình xình 2 ngày rồi.

Có 1 bài báo rất hay. Nhưng vì link ở trên net phải đăng ký mới đọc được, nên nhà em xin phép mode post thẳng vào đây để anh em tham khảo:

Why this will not be a normal cyclical recovery

By Roger Altman

Published: April 5 2009 19:23 | Last updated: April 5 2009 19:23

The rare nature of this recession precludes a cyclically normal US recovery. Instead, we are consigned to a slow, painful climb-out, as are nations such as Japan and Mexico that depend on US demand. The implications for US policy include a likely second round of stimulus, much more federal capital for the banking system and stunning budget deficits that will slow key initiatives for President Barack Obama, such as healthcare and energy reform.

What is unusual is that this is a balance-sheet driven recession, centred on the damaged financial condition of both households and banks. These weaknesses mandate sub-normal levels of consumer spending and overall lending for about three years.

In contrast, most postwar recessions had a different sequence – rising inflationary pressures, a monetary tightening to counter them and, then, a slowdown in response to higher interest rates. This was the pattern of the sharp 1980-81 slowdown.

None of that happened here. Instead, we saw a housing and credit market collapse that caused enormous losses among households and banks. The result was a steep drop in discretionary consumer spending and a halt to lending. To see why recovery will be slow, we can look at the balance sheet damage. For households, net worth peaked in mid-2007 at $64,400bn (€47,750, £43,449bn) but fell to $51,500bn at the end of 2008, a swift 20 per cent fall. With average family income at $50,000, and falling in real terms since 2000, a 20 per cent drop in net worth is big – especially when household debt reached 130 per cent of income in 2008.

This debt derived from Americans spending more than their income, reflecting the positive wealth effect. Households felt wealthier, despite pressure on incomes, because home and financial asset values were rising. Now that wealth effect has reversed with a vengeance. The crisis and unemployment have frightened households into raising savings rates for the first time in years. They had been stagnant at 1-2 per cent of income but have surged to nearly 5 per cent. With reduced incomes, only cutting discretionary spending can produce higher savings. This explains why personal consumption expenditures fell at record rates at the end of 2008.

Consumer spending, however, has approximated 70 per cent of US gross domestic product for the past decade and dominates our economy. But household balance sheets will not be rebuilt soon. Home values will keep falling through mid-2010 and there is no precedent for equity markets, still down 45 per cent from their peak, to make those losses up in just two years. It is illogical, therefore, to expect a full snap-back in the consumer sector in 2010 or 2011. This alone mandates a drawn-out, weak recovery.

The second key sector is the financial one. According to the International Monetary Fund, western financial institutions, mostly in the US, have realised $1,000bn of losses on US-originated assets since the crisis began. The IMF has estimated that unrealised losses may amount to another $1,000bn. With residential and commercial real estate steadily declining, this is possible. This is why the banking sector cannot make new loans. These losses are eating into banks’ capital and shrinking their capacity to add assets. Funds from the Troubled Asset Relief Program are only replacing lost capital, not increasing it. When might they end? With key categories of toxic assets still losing value, the answer is: not soon. The scale of lending needed to support a normal cyclical recovery will not materialise.

A third constraint on recovery may involve the federal balance sheet. The fiscal and monetary engines are currently on full throttle. But, within two years, concerns over budget deficits and inflation may revive, compelling the Federal Reserve to raise interest rates and Congress to adopt deficit reduction steps. These actions, contractionary by definition, could occur before a full recovery has asserted itself. On that basis, the federal balance sheet would also limit a full recovery.

This weak outlook is likely to force a second injection of spending rises and tax cuts in 2010 to prod demand. Despite public opposition, substantially more federal capital will be required for banks. The deficit outlook will worsen, perhaps to $1,000bn annually over 10 years. That will force a slowing of Mr Obama’s investment plans. That is a shame, because those investments are needed, but this balance sheet recession will be too deep.

The writer is chairman and CEO of Evercore Partners and former deputy Treasury secretary in the Clinton Administration

Bác bảo hay mà em không biết hay chổ nào. Nhiều từ chuyên môn quá, tiếng Anh còi nữa nên đọc khó quá. Bác nào khá, dịch hộ anh em đi. Em hứa vote nhiệt tình.

 

[huytct]

Mở bát DJ đã tèo rồi! Mai lại vui đây!!!:21::21::21:

 

[N-DESIGN]

Sáng mai có trần đầu giờ được 1 lúc không nhỉ để em còn té kịp :21::21::21:

Chắc không kịp rồi cụ ơi! DJ đang đỏ lòm, châu Âu cũng vậy. Quả này em bị kẹp t..r..i..m rồi.:'(:'(:'(

 

[tdhien]

Giờ này vẫn còn cổ cánh hả các pác???? bây giờ người ta chuyển sang đùi với lườn rồi ạ :21:

 

[hieuminh]

Mai mở thớt mới đê! (c)(c)(c)(c)(c)

 

[hieuminh]

Mai mà teo thì chưa đúng ý thầy Biz đâu, phải 2 phiên nữa mới đúng thầy nhỉ! Ôi tiền mặt .
@Khôi! khi nào vào vàng đc hú tôi một câu nhé

 

[nlthanh]

Em vẫn tin ngày mai VNI nó cửng nhẹ

 

[bes]

Tẽo 118 điểm rồi :redface::redface::redface:

@hieuminh : ngày lành tháng tốt sẽ có thớt mới, gớm, mong gì mà ghê thế

 

[Zray]

may hôm trước em xả đc 1 chút, ko hiểu thông tin gói kích cầu đợt 2 có cứu vớt đc tý nào ko , biết đâu cụ bes kịp xả ra giá trần

 

[bizviet]

Sai rồi. Index có thể tèo, nhưng thằng của mình phải sau phiên 1 thứ 4 mới có thể tèo .

Nếu mai mà Index nó down mạnh thì còn có cửa cho anh em bắt sóng, còn nếu nó mà loằng ngoằng tăng giảm nhẹ là không khéo nó lại rơi vào đúng các tiêu chí thị trường ở đỉnh như nhà em post hôm trước đấy.

Thằng DJ mất 2 phiên lình xình rồi mới có phiên tèo mạnh như hôm nay. Để kiểm nghiệm xem index có thế không?

DJ cứ tèo dần đều thế này khéo hôm nay nó phải tèo đến 200 điểm ấy chứ.

Chẳng biết VNI thế nào chứ Châu Âu là có thằng to vật vã nó hô sell. Rally may be ending.

Mai mà thằng F của em bên Buy mà không chất hàng CE và ATO đủ 400k là em té luôn phiên 1 đấy

Mai mà teo thì chưa đúng ý thầy Biz đâu, phải 2 phiên nữa mới đúng thầy nhỉ! Ôi tiền mặt .